The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relation to what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind. A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguished from the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the Churchlands. Meta-scientific eliminativism views folk psychology qua folksy as unsuited to offer insight into the structure of cognition, although it might otherwise be indispensable for our social commerce and self-understanding. This position flows from a general thesis that scientific advance is marked by an eschewal of folk understanding. The latter half of the paper argues that, contrary to the received view, Chomsky's review of Skinner offers not just an argument against Skinner's eliminativism, but, more centrally, one in favour of the second eliminativism.
) review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior ([1957] )lays reasonable claim to being perhaps the most foundational text of cognitive science and contemporary philosophy of mind. By current jargon, Skinner was an eliminativist: folk psychological notions should be swept away; in their place will be a new conceptual scheme that has proved itself fecund in the explanation of the behaviour of simpler organisms. What Chomsky's review achieved, or at least contributed to, so the received view goes, is not only a demolition of the scientific pretensions of behaviourist psychology but also the legitimization of our mentalistic folk idioms, whereby we may read our notions of belief, knowledge, meaning, etc. as being the proprietary vocabulary for the framing of genuine explanations of the structure and aetiology of linguistic and other 'rational' action. It is not difficult to understand why such a reading should have prevailed. A few years after his review, Chomsky was to change the landscape of linguistics, psychology, and philosophy by his resuscitation of 'innate ideas' and, in particular, his claim that the object of linguistic inquiry was a speaker/hearer's implicit knowledge of language, not linguistic behaviour directly. 1 Unlike Skinner and those philosophers he influenced, Chomsky, it seemed, was perfectly happy to use folk psychological idioms at the heart of his theories. (None of this is to suggest that Skinner's particular brand of behaviourism would otherwise have prevailed-it was soon superseded within behaviourist psychology itself.)
The sequel will contend that Chomsky's review is best read in a certain eliminativist light; further, that its argument, so read, is still of the greatest import to current philosophical debate. In essence, my thought is that the key moral of the Chomsky review-a moral we should endorse-is that if we are to have a genuine science of the mind, then our ordinary categories and explanations about language will be left behind, just as, uncontroversially, the development of the hard sciences left in their wake folk conceptions of matter, life, etc.
Before we begin in earnest, it bears noting that 'folk psychology' is often used in a quasi-technical sense to designate an idealized model of propositional attitude reasoning. The sequel will adopt this usage. In truth, of course, our quotidian reasoning about mental life is highly nuanced and supports many fine-grained distinctions (e.g. Austin [1961] on excuses). The subtlety of the folk, however, will not affect my contentions, for my charge is not that their psychology fails in some descriptive task, still less that a new 'scientific' nomenclature is at hand that is subtler still. My charge is only that folk notions do not essentially enter into the explanations of mature scientific inquiry and that such inquiry is not beholden to support or substantiate the distinctions and categories our folksy notions delineate. This position does not denigrate folk psychology; nor does it rest upon a crude caricature of the inordinate 1 See (Chomsky [1962] , [1964] , [1965] , [1966] ). The works of this period can be seen as a psychologizing of the framework presented in Chomsky's then unpublished The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory ([1955-56/1975] ). See (Collins [2004] ) for discussion of this transition. complexity of our everyday thinking about mental life; indeed, as we shall see, there is every reason to think that our folksy way of thinking is here to stay, albeit not on scientific duty.
Preliminaries: What Meta-scientific Eliminativism is Not
'Eliminativism' 2 is a term of art, mostly used to pick out the argument common to both Skinner and the Churchlands, who differ only in regard to what the 'new sciences' are that will usher in our new conception of mentality: respectively, learning theory (operant conditioning) and neuroscience. 3 The arguments orbiting this position have been much discussed and I do not intend to add to that debate here, at least not directly. 4 My concern, rather, is with what distance there might be between our folksy conception of our mental life and what we should and, indeed, might expect from a genuine science of the mind. My contention is that the distance will be substantial. I shall refer to this position as an instance of meta-scientific eliminativism. I coin this term to bring into relief the radicalism of Chomsky's position, which is usually thought to be diametric to eliminativism on any understanding, and also as a response to Rey ([2003a] , pp. 124-7), who worries that, were we to take Chomsky at his most recent word, he would be a kind of eliminativist. My contention is precisely that he is an eliminativist of a kind. 5 Some initial qualifications are in order. Firstly, this position does not entail or even suggest that standard attributions of mental states across the whole spectrum from calculating in maths to having a toothache are false or even explanatorily redundant. Consider the question: Can machines think? We should, I think, be perfectly 2 The Churchlands (see note 3) use the expression 'eliminative materialism'. It is best to drop the noun here and nominalize the adjective, for the noun does no work at all. The claim at issue concerns the relationship between folk notions and science, which is not illuminated by the dark notion of materialism. Chomsky ([2000a] ) is dismissive of eliminative materialism as he is of all materialisms.
3 See , [1986] and Churchland and Churchland [1998] ). The association between the Churchlands and Skinner is not often made, save for the purposes of insult, although not only are their arguments structurally the same, but the wider euphoric claims about the change in our folk self-conception are also strikingly similar as found in (Skinner [1971] ; Churchland [1995] , Chapters 10 and 11). A version of eliminativism can also be found in (Quine [1960] ), who was directly influenced by Skinner. 4 See, among others, (Schiffer [1987] ; Fodor [1987] ; McGinn [1989] ; Sterelny [1990] ), and the debate in (Greenwood [1991] ). Churchland ([1991] ) responds to many of the criticisms. 5 As so minimally characterized, dualism would count as a brand of meta-scientific eliminativism in so far as according to that doctrine mental phenomena would fall outside of scientific inquiry. I take all relevant parties, however, to be naturalists; that is, there is no question of 'mental' phenomena, such as belief-desire reasoning or linguistic competence, being sui generis different in kind from other phenomena studied by science. I take eliminativism to be a doctrine about explanation and method rather than metaphysics. (My thanks go to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.) happy, as was Turing ([1950] ), to say that machines will be thinkers just when we as unthinkingly attribute mental states to them across the relevant spectrum as we do to fellow humans. Of course, this is not a behaviourist position at all, for it could be that we are 'fooled' in some way (everyone apart from you could turn out to be remote controlled from Mars-Philip K. Dick appeared to think so most of the time). The thought, rather, is just that taking a mental attribution to be true does not, as such, commit us to any specific theoretical account of what is going on internal to the system, although, theoretically, we know that something quite specific must be going on. In short, the grounds for our folksy attributions of mental states to all kinds of systems do not appear to be under threat from theories of the internal cognitive structure, even though, barring magic, there must be such fine structure for the mental phenomena to be realized in us, but not rabbits or rocks. In this light, it is just not coherent to imagine that any future science of the mind that does not deal with folk categories will have ipso facto refuted our folk psychology. After all, quantum physics does not show that tables lack shape; indeed, one day we might get around to giving a quantum mechanical explanation of why they do have the shape they have.
Similarly, it is difficult to see how any scientific developments will impugn folksy explanation across vast tracts of mental life. Of course, there are glaring holes, such as mental illness, and the folk have little to say about binocular vision or how we are able to locate an object acoustically, etc. But none of that shows that the explanation of why Bill caught a plane rather a train (because he wanted to get where he was going more quickly) is in anyway suspect. Again, one day we might be able to offer a different and better explanation, but that does not tell us that the explanation currently on offer is no good. Einstein allows for better explanations of motion than Newtonian mechanics, but it just does not follow that Newton's explanations were defective or no good across vast tracts of phenomena.
Secondly, rather than being comparable to astrology or demonology, folk psychology, at least to a good degree, is much closer to a cognitive competence such as language, folk physics, or even vision, and we may study it just as we study our other cognitive capacities, whose abandonment has never so much as been entertained.
Folk psychology has a cluster of features that support its general classification with such cognitive competencies as folk physics: (i) save for various pathologies or later trauma, it is a universal species-specific trait; (ii) it is developmentally canalized, i.e. the key factor in its maturation is the normal development of the human brain; and (iii) it can be selectively impaired or spared amid broad cognitive disruption. These characteristics pattern folk psychology with language, vision, folk physics, etc., not astrology.
It perhaps goes without saying that the nature of folk psychology as a cognitive phenomenon is an empirical issue, and so dogmatism is not apt; each of the three characteristics presented is variably tendentious, although they enjoy a certain consensus. 6 For the present argument, it suffices that the cognitive basis of folk psychology is a variation on the theme of the trio of features adumbrated, for there is little doubt that broad and varied features of human psychology are universal, biological features of our species. If all this is so, then the future elimination of folk psychology in toto makes little sense, absent at best dubious science fiction. Further, the putative explanatory penury of folk psychology becomes quite beside the point. This point bears some emphasis.
If folk psychology is as degenerating-in the Lakatosian sense-as the Churchlands contend, then such 'failure' will be germane to its elimination just to the degree to which we make a science of it. Perhaps the damning diagnosis is accurate, but nothing follows save that we should not constrain the theories we develop to cleave to our folksy conceptions of phenomena, a position perfectly well understood in physics, chemistry, and biology. Our best science appears to tell us that the natural world has very little to do with the determinations made by our innate categories, but no one is proposing that we eliminate our whole cognitive make-up. 7 In what way, then, might we look upon our common understanding of phenomena as being systematically unsuitable for scientific theorizing? An ideal in science is the greatest empirical coverage via the smallest number of basic laws or principles. Approaching this ideal creates 'deep' explanations, for the basic laws are increasingly distant from the description of phenomena so as to cover otherwise disparate phenomena; thus, the explanation of any given phenomenon becomes more inferentially complex.
8 This kind of 'depth' explanation typically involves the creation of new categories (forces, genes, valences, sub-atomic particles, etc.), whereby we freely leave behind 6
Much of the debate on the cognitive basis of folk psychology (or 'Theory of Mind') does not question the three properties listed, although there is much disagreement about the degree to which they obtain. The main debate turns on the ontogeny and structure of folk psychological competence (see, e.g. Davies and Stone [1995a], [1995b] ; Carruthers and Smith [1996] ). Suffice it to say that no one in the cognitive literature, even those of a broadly 'interactionist' bent (e.g. Garfield [2000] ), views the competence as analogous to astrology, for the presumption is that it has a cognitive as opposed to a broadly historical or cultural basis. The species-specificity of 'theory of mind' is also controversial. Still, this offers no succour to the eliminativist, for even if other primates do possess a belief-desire competence, this, just like in us, will presumably have a cognitive basis.
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This point applies equally against the view that folk psychology is an 'essentially dramatic idiom ' (e.g. Quine [1960] ; Stich [1983] ), unless, of course, we are to understand folk physics, say, as essentially dramatic. Compare: 'the grand aim of all science . . . is to cover the greatest possible number of empirical facts by logical deduction from the smallest possible number of hypotheses or axioms' (Einstein [1954], p. 282) . Also see (Feynman [1965] ).
our common conception of phenomena in order to find a unity behind the phenomena. For example, sponges, trees, and bacteria might not appear to have the vitality of humans or other animals, but modern biology sees no such distinction, for all of theses kinds have a genetic structure that goes to determine a phenotype. It might be, of course, that in some cases our extant concepts are fit for the explanatory purposes at hand, but that would appear to be a lucky coincidence, and in no case is it plausible to view a mature science as beholden to the categories and modes of explanation currently employed in our everyday understanding of the world. So, it is not so much that linguistics, say, tells us that 'English' does not exist or that physics tells us that there are no tables; rather, the sciences simply leave behind the 'surface' categories under which such questions can be posed. Physics does not deal with furniture and linguistics does not deal with geopolitics. A contrast that might serve to govern intuitions here is that our visual field has three dimensions, while physical space has a so-farundetermined number somewhere around eleven by current theory. We can, of course, investigate the resources of the human visual system and even attribute systematic 'error' to it. The present point, however, is not that any of our native cognitive faculties are beyond right or wrong; rather, it is now perfectly trivial to say that theories of physical space are not premised upon how things strike us. Investigation of physical space and investigation of the human visual system are two distinct lines of inquiry; the latter does not constrain the former. If physical space turned out to be just as our visual system determined it to be, then it would seem that the kind of transcendental explanation Kant called for would be in order.
In general, the innateness of categories and explanatory schemata does not ipso facto mark them apt to form the basis of a science. Whether a science of a particular domain is forthcoming or not is wholly independent of the character or even existence of a folk theory of that domain; witness, for example, molecular biology and superconductivity. There is, in short, a mismatch between our native 'theories' that are our ready means of understanding the world as we find it and mature science that treats such a world as phenomena with an underlying unity beyond the determination of our given categories and explanations.
Meta-scientific Eliminativism
A futurological eliminativism that predicts the demise of folksy ways of thinking seems to me to obscure rather than illuminate the serious question of how our ordinary ways of thinking stand towards our theoretical pursuits. Further, if we grant that much of our ordinary modes of thought are innately determined, then talk of the demise of folk psychology should be regarded as being equally silly as talk of the demise of vision or language or folk physics. In other words, once folk psychology is properly understood to be a cognitive trait to some interesting extent, its fate would appear to be wholly independent of its utility or otherwise as the basis for a science of the mind. This conclusion is an instance of a general thesis about the relationship between innate conceptual competencies and developed natural sciences. The thesis is what we may term meta-scientific eliminativism (M-SE):
The categories and explanatory schemata of folk and/or innate 'theories' do not form a constraint on the domains of explanations of mature sciences (ones that seek increasingly deeper explanation). The extent to which sciences might be developed for folk domains is an open question, wholly independent of the relative explanatory worth of the relevant folk theories. Folk theories and science are simply orthogonal.
Applied to folk psychology, a consequence of M-SE is that the concepts of belief, desire, etc., and practical syllogistic reasoning are not to be expected to form any part of the explanatory base of a successful science of the mind. A crucial qualification expressed in the second sentence of M-SE is that this conclusion is in no way dependent on a particular alternative, be it behaviourism or neuroscience. Indeed, as far as M-SE dictates, there might never be a worthwhile science of the mind; folk psychology might be our fate, the only president we shall ever have (LBJ in perpetuity), but this would not lend it any scientific credence. In other words, M-SE says that folk psychology qua folksy has no constraining or explanatory role to play, regardless of the actual character or even possibility of a genuine science of the mind. Of course, this is not to suggest that folk notions are useless to any putative science, or should be wholly eschewed. Folk notions might be essential to picking out classes of phenomena. This certainly seems to be the case in linguistics, to which I shall return. In psychology generally, informant judgement is currently indispensable, not only to the experimental paradigms but also to the very identification of the cognitive phenomena. This is obviously so in cases of pathology and psychiatric disorder. M-SE does not question this.
A full defence of M-SE is far beyond the scope of the present paper; a number of qualifying remarks, however, are in order. First off, M-SE does not deny a cognitive base to scientific reasoning; still less is it intended to suggest that there are no limits set by human cognition on the phenomena open to human understanding. Indeed, modern science might be such a difficult and precarious inquiry precisely because it is continually reaching the bounds of our native understanding. 9 What is ruled out is the thought that the domains 9 This is a position for which Chomsky ([1975] , [1993], [2000a] ) has long argued. For a critical discussion, see (Collins [2002] ). of successful science map onto and elaborate our commonsense domains. 10 Nor is M-SE an a priori claim about our concept of science; rather, it is part descriptive, part normative. The descriptive part seeks to encapsulate certain prominent features of scientific development since the 17th century: continuing abstraction, idealization, conceptual creation, and the positing of unobservables. In other words, science does not have as its target a complete and coherent description of the world as we find it, the world as delineated by our given categories; instead, its aim is to seek highly abstract 'hidden' laws and mechanisms that unify otherwise heterogeneous phenomena, in light of which our given categories drop out, at best, as shallow and partial taxonomic artefacts. 11 A striking and foundational example of this approach is Newton's laws of motion, which have numerous familiar counter-intuitive consequences. The same kind of departure from common categorizations can be found throughout the physical sciences; the case of relativity, quantum mechanics and more recent developments in physics are, again, striking and familiar examples.
For any given example, of course, it might be objected that the putative move away from the common understanding is no such move at all, but is just a reorganization, as it were, of existing notions. Indeed, it could also be objected that commonsense has never been 'mechanical' in the sense that occupied Leibniz, Huygens, Newton, Clarke, and others, but it does not follow from that, even if it were true, that the developments in physics did not radically depart from commonsense assumptions, such as the hypothesized properties of inertial mass (equally alien was the idea of universal gravity under which every body stands in a gravitational relation to every other body). Quite apart from this, however, the crucial factor is the willingness of scientists to leave behind mechanisms in pursuit of formally elaborated theories that touch upon phenomena only at certain points. Of course, 'mechanisms' are always sought (such as Newton's ether and gravitons in contemporary physics), but not so as to render abstraction in line with the world as we find it, but so as to unify physical laws. The second issue is more tricky, but no one has any doubt that the elaborations of mechanics from Newton to the present have left behind 10 The extent to which the concepts and explanations of developed sciences are based on the resources of innate folk 'theories' remains an open empirical question (e.g. Carey and Spelke [1994] ). For discussion of this issue, see (Carruthers et al. [2002] ). None of my arguments here depends upon science being originally divorced from our innate conception of phenomena; my claim is only that sciences freely depart from folksy understandings and have been successful insofar as they have done.
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See (Koyré [1957] ) for a seminal discussion of these themes.
commonsense, independently of whether we have a particular problem with 'action at a distance '. 12 A related issue concerns the accessibility of theories. I do not take M-SE to entail that theoretical developments will become increasingly inaccessible to normal humans. The picture is mixed, but it is not hyperbolic to say that most of modern science is teachable to the willing and submits to 'popularization', complex mathematics apart. It is certainly false to say that post-Newtonian science is accessible only to an intellectual elite. My claim, however, is only that modern science departs form our 'natural theories' of the world. We require specific instruction to see the world in a post-Newtonian way, and we cannot even think about 'seeing' the world in a quantum mechanical way. The case of language is instructive. It is relatively easy to teach artificial symbol systems to normal humans, but this does not make such systems natural languages. Their acquisition requires specific instruction and the level of up-take varies. Both of these characteristics distinguish artificial systems from natural language. In a sense, we can think of modern science as similar to artificial formal systems: they are developed for specific purposes, freely depart from their natural counterparts, and require specific tutelage.
The normative part of M-SE is the thought that to do successful science is to approach phenomena in the manner of the physical scientist; in particular, common categories and explanations should play no constraining role. Thus, the thought that folk psychology will not ground a genuine science of the mind drops out as an instance of a general norm, in the absence of special dualistic pleading on behalf of psychology.
This norm is a posteriori; that is, as a matter of fact, the only cases of long-term progress in science are those to which M-SE applies. It might be that this is purely accidental; there is no a priori determination of the matter one way or the other. Of course, sailing under the colours of science are many varied disciplines that rest content with folk categories. The crucial factor here, however, is that there is no constraint on the sciences to do so; indeed, it might well be that progress is often made when departures from common 12 Georges Rey (personal communication) suggested to me that, given the prevalence of belief in ghosts, spirits, and other non-corporeal entities, 'action at a distance' might not be so alien to folk ideas. Such cases are tricky to interpret. Firstly, such entities are typically posited as being outside of the natural order, i.e. part of their very strangeness is their 'action at a distance' powers. No one who believes in ghosts happily generalizes their curious powers. Secondly, it is not straightforward to determine just what belief in the non-corporeal amounts to. Boyer ([1993] ), from an anthropological perspective, avers that cultures that appear to sanction non-corporeal entities are much more ontologically conservative than they seem to be. Again, 'spirits' appear to be strict exceptions to a 'normal' ontology that is still broadly constrained by the normal course of events.
understanding are made, such as in areas of economics and game theory. 13 Mind, if we are to judge certain sciences as relatively unsuccessful, at least as compared to physics or chemistry, this cannot be merely because they retain an allegiance to the folk; rather, it is surely because they have conspicuously failed to develop and confirm deductively deep abstract generalizations that unify otherwise disparate phenomena of their domains such that they are predictive of future and novel phenomena. Their folksiness is a symptom of their failure. Why folksiness should correlate with explanatory failure is not an a priori question. Still, if we believe that our cognition is not designed to understand the universe in all its complexity-we are not gods-then it should come as no surprise that our given categories and modes of explanation quickly give way before complex phenomena. Such an attitude is not physics envy. Physics and the other hard sciences have been able to progress precisely because idealization and (mathematical) abstraction have proved fruitful in leading to deeper and deeper explanation. The problem, perhaps, with the human sciences is that we are dazzled by the surface complexity, perhaps rightly: it might be that there simply is nothing but noise for our kind of mind when we advance beyond mathematical idealizations that are so fruitfully employed in the hard sciences.
Folk psychology and cognitive science
Even if the above admonishments were to be accepted in their generality, a particular claim is available on behalf of folk psychology. One might argue as follows. 'One area where we have recently been able to make some progress is psychology. This has been enabled by viewing cognition as a set of computational processes defined over symbolic structures. In its essence, this idea is traceable to the Cartesian revolution and the view of the mind as a space in which ideas could be composed and decomposed, but mathematical advances in the early 20th century made clear how the componential and productive structure of thought could be adequately theorised as computation. This model turns out to be a vindication of folk psychology, for it shows how intentional mental states (picked out by the language of the folk) may be causally productive of behaviour insofar as they are computational states whose transformations supervene on physical structures that can be identified independently of the ''information'' they carry. Thus, intentional generalizations get to be explanatory of behaviour because they are instantiated by computational states: computation allows for 13 Of course, much of biology still works at the level of taxonomy, and evolutionary explanation remains detached from physical and chemical principles, but progress to deeper explanation is evolving (see e.g. Kauffman [1993] ; Arthur [2002] ; Pennisi [2002] ). the interface of mental content with physical structure; it puts folksy belief and desire at the steering wheel'. 14 The issues here are very complex. Let us just consider the issue of whether, assuming that the computational model is a real advance, folk notions acquire an explanatory status qua computational.
15 I shall return to this issue with specific reference to linguistics below. The argument presented offers, at the very best, a vindication of the metaphysics of mental causation as opposed to a naturalistic theory of cognition (cf. Egan [1999] , p. 186, on the 'naturalization' of propositional attitude content). That is, the argument perhaps shows how it is possible for representations, in the full-blown folksy intentional sense (whatever that might precisely amount to), to be causally active; the argument goes no way at all to show that an actual science of the mind should or must be framed in, or even make appeal to, folk terms. In effect, the argument may be viewed as a response to Kant's position in the Critique of Practical Reason that determinations of the will (mental causation) are categorically distinct from phenomenal events (physical causes and effects). The computation argument places mental states in a world of uniform causality. Whether such a placement answers the concerns of Kant and many others is not our concern.
16 What is 14 See (Fodor [1975] ; Pylyshyn [1984] ) for classic statements of this argument. It should be mentioned that computation and the related notion of a 'Language of Thought' (LoT) have work to do quite independently of behaviour causation; e.g. the explanation of rational inference, systematicity, productivity, etc., although these properties of thought do obviously bear upon the pattern of a system's behaviour. This latter work, however, simply requires (or so the argument goes) the brain to realize a system of discrete infinity of the right complexity to support, say, a phrase bracketing. LoT serves this end, but this end does not vindicate any folk conception. Indeed, it is a formal condition that is independent of how, if at all, one construes the intentionality of folk mentalism. The digital computer is an existence proof that a physical system, such as the human brain, can realize the appropriate complexity of structure, but the digital computer need not be understood to instantiate any intentional generalization (law) at the folk level.
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Thus, my present concern is not with mental causation as such, but with whether computationalism in particular offers a scientific role for folk categories through mental causation. If one thinks mental causation is independent of computationalism or any other scientific framework (e.g. the seminal position of Davidson [1980] ), then we are not, without further ado, in dispute.
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For Kant of the first and second Critiques, there is a notion of causality that is premised on the concept of freedom, of which we are only aware through the acknowledgement of the moral law as a condition on practical reason. Fodor, among many others, freely talks of mental causation without broaching the central Kantian question of freedom. Chomsky ([1966], [1975], [2000a] ) has long been sceptical that the notion of causality in its physical application has any purchase on action 'at will', especially linguistic performance, precisely because it is free or creative. Clearly, Chomsky does not subscribe to the argument from computation as presented (see Collins [2004] , [2006] ). Chomsky ([1986] ) dubs the issue of freedom Descartes problem, after Descartes' postulation of a second substance precisely to separate those phenomena which fell outside of his mechanics. Chomsky's position also (independently) recapitulates Schopenhauer's ([1835 Schopenhauer's ([ /1999 ) magnificent discussion, where, on non-transcendental grounds, the 'act' of will falls outside of our understanding of causation; for Schopenhauer, this essential lacuna in explanation holds throughout our understanding of the natural world.
clear is that an argument for a metaphysical possibility is not a demonstration of a science. 17 Here, then, are two kinds of eliminativism. The first kind-futurological-is premised upon a misconception of the cognitive basis of folk psychological competence. We have, therefore, no good reason whatsoever to expect the demise of such a competence, independent of whether the folk categories are fit for scientific duty or not. The second kind of eliminativism-metascientific-is a perfectly coherent thesis that is flush with the proper cognitive understanding of the basis of the competence. The two eliminativisms share the thought that folk categories are not the stuff out of which successful science is made. The latter eliminativism parts company with the former via the thought that this 'failure' in no way signals the general demise of the folk categories, whether or not a genuine science of the mind is forthcoming from some other source; indeed, it is quite consistent to be a meta-scientific eliminativist and also to think that there will never be such a science of the mind. The next section will show that Chomsky circa the review of Skinner was such an eliminativist. The following sections will briefly diagnose the common (mis)interpretation of Chomsky and highlight that Chomsky is now perfectly explicit about his (meta-scientific) eliminativism. So, all else being equal, Chomsky has always been such an eliminativist. Chomsky's ([1959] ) review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior marks the first time Chomsky explicitly approached issues of language acquisition and the psychology of language more generally. His earlier work, including The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory ([1955-56/1975] ), Syntactic Structures ([1957] ), and various papers on computational aspects of grammars, do not, for example, offer any explicit argument against empiricism, still less an explicit argument for nativism. For sure, we need not imagine that it suddenly occurred to Chomsky that the new linguistics was incompatible with the then prevailing 17 It is, of course, a virtue of our folksy mode of explanation that it has application to nigh-on all phenomena, from rivers, plants, insects, and humans, but this is also a flaw, at least if we expect the purposive mode to be on explanatory duty, a point perhaps first recognized by Kant ([1790 Kant ([ /2000 ), in response to Herder among others. Thus, we can gloss our explanation of insect behaviour in terms of the organism's representation to itself of various physical features of its environment or the values that enter a 'dead reckoning' procedure, but we need not see the insect as having any attitude towards such information-we are describing a system the insect's brain realizes; we know the insect is not an agent (see Gallistel [1990] for beautiful work on insect computation).
Two Readings of Chomsky's Review of Skinner
See Egan ([1992] , [1995] , [1999] , [2003] ) for an account of computational cognitive states that does not involve content as an essential individuative aspect, but which still views content, even wide content, as explanatorily key. For a somewhat different internalist take on the relation of content to computation, see (Chomsky et al. [1998] ; Chomsky [2003a] ; Collins [2006] ). empiricism in psychology and the philosophy of mind; some 20 years later Chomsky explains that the notions of innateness and universal grammar were in the background, too audacious to be then put forward. 18 This timidity is even reflected in the Skinner review, where only after Skinner's claims are demolished is a nativist account of language acquisition properly discussed (see below). Further, as Chomsky ([1967] ) was to lament, the discussion is far from forthright: nativism is offered as a speculative proposal, albeit one certainly worth considering given the vacuity of the only apparent alternative. We may note, then, two aspects of Chomsky's thought at the time of the Skinner review:
1. The new linguistics is not premised upon any psychological thesis, including nativism; a fortiori, there is no constraint on the nature or status of the new linguistic theories issuing from folk psychology.
2. A refutation of behaviourism in the domain of language is possible independent of any particular positive account of language acquisition or the psychological standing of linguistic competence more generally; a fortiori, the refutation of behaviourism does not depend on, nor entail, the appropriateness or soundness of folk categories in the explanation or foundation of the new linguistics.
With these two thoughts in place, let us now consider a first reading of the argument of Chomsky's review.
(FA, the Fallacious Argument)
1. The behaviourists (Skinner) argue that colloquial mentalistic vocabulary (folk psychology) is non-explanatory of behaviour; it may be fruitfully replaced by learning theoretic vocabulary (stimulus, response, control, reinforcement, probability, etc.) , which place the causes of behaviour in environmental variables, not internal states.
2. The learning theoretic vocabulary is in fact non-explanatory; or at least the folk vocabulary does a better job.
3. Such folksy vocabulary is 'the only president we've got'.
4. Therefore, ceteris paribus, such a vocabulary provides an appropriate basis for the explanation of behaviour.
This argument reads the review not merely as a refutation of Skinner's behaviourism, but also as a defence of folk psychology. Before assessing the premises and the logic of this argument, a question of attribution arises. I offer FA as a reconstruction of the received view of the Skinner review. FA has certainly been offered to me numerous times in discussions of Chomsky's 18 See the Introduction to (Chomsky [1955 (Chomsky [ -56/1975 ); for discussion, see (Collins [2004] ). review; certainly no argument that explicitly rejects FA has, to my knowledge, been entertained in the philosophical literature; for introductory texts that seamlessly move from the Skinner review to a folksy-based understanding of cognitive science, see (Pylyshyn [1984] ; Devitt and Sterelny [1987] ; Rey [1997] ). More importantly, one can see the argument generally at work in the nigh-on consensus between friend and foe alike that Chomsky is concerned with a propositional conception of knowledge of language (competence) and so is a defender of the explanatory worth of folk categories. 19 If FA has a true father, however, then it is Jerry Fodor. Fodor's ([1968b] ) Psychological Explanation is, in essence, a spinning out of FA against all of the then current non-mentalist positions. Chomsky is cited only once in an insignificant footnote, but the preface tells us that '[r]eaders familiar with the work of Professor Noam Chomsky will hardly fail to detect its influence on the general approach to psychological explanation taken here. Indeed, this book is in part an attempt to make explicit some aspects of a view of psychological explanation that comports naturally with the generative approach to language' (Fodor [1968b] , p. ix). Since 1968, Fodor has continued to read generative linguistics within the framework of folk psychological categories; indeed, he insists upon it. 20 This reading, it must be noted, is not a mere exegetical motif in Fodor's work; it is central to his project that successful cognitive science, e.g. linguistics, serves as evidence of the fecundity and soundness of scientific psychology being an extension, at least in part, of our folk understanding. After I have offered an alternative reading of the review, I shall suggest various reasons why, on my understanding, the erroneous construal prevailed.
The argument of FA is quite familiar and need not detain us. Two points, however, are worth making. Firstly, while I mean to reject FA, I do not for a moment wish to suggest that Chomsky does not impugn the explanatory credentials of behaviourism; my target is the move from this critique to the conclusion of FA. Secondly, it is worth noting, if only because of the over-determined nature of the 'behaviourism' label, that Skinner did not understand himself to be a 'logical behaviourist'. That is, Skinner was not 19 For references to and criticism of the traditional reading of 'knowledge of language', see (Collins [2004] ; McGilvray [1999] , [2002] ). For recent renditions of the view, see (Knowles [2000] ; Barber [2003] ; Matthews [2003] ). Matthews, for one, has long been sensitive to the inadequacies of what he calls the 'received view' (see Matthews [1991] ). Rey ([2003a Rey ([ ], [2003b ) shares the traditional view although sees Chomsky as only recently departing from it (see below).
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For example, (Fodor [1983] , pp. 4-5): 'what is innately represented should constitute a bona fide object of propositional attitudes; what's innate must be the sort of thing that can be the value of a propositional variable in such schemas as ''x knows (/believes/cognizes) that P''' (cf. Fodor [2000] , pp. 10-11.) This constraint goes back to Fodor ([1975] ) and is echoed in (Fodor [2000] , [2001] ). See below for Chomsky's rejection of this constraint. Interestingly, in (Fodor [1981] ), where he spells-out 'the right view of what linguistics is about', he makes no appeal to the propositional attitudes, but rests content with the sound observation that a grammar is not merely evidentially constrained by intuition.
concerned to show that notions of belief, meaning, intention, etc. can be analysed in terms of a basic behavioural vocabulary. Skinner's position was that mentalistic vocabulary should be swept away, not analysed. This may be seen by considering the paradigm that Skinner was seeking to extrapolate to the human case. An account of the operant conditioning of a rat in a bar pressing regime is not an analysis of an extant intentional explanation; rather, one explains the behaviour simply through an understanding of the process by which the behaviour becomes contingent on certain environmental variables. Just so in the human case, although, of course, since we do have an extant alternative explanation, this just means that the extant account is to be replaced. As we shall now see, the chief part of Chomsky's actual complaint against Skinner is precisely that his accounts do collapse into a misshapen analysis of familiar folk modes of description and explanation.
The problem with FA, then, is the reasoning that moves from the inadequacy of learning theory to the crediting of folk psychology. This enthymematic logic is easily missed, if one is fixated on the eliminativist dialectic that goes from the apparent inviolability of folk psychology to the learning theoretic approach as its usurper. But, of course, we are not given here any initial good reason to think that the folk categories were explanatorily in order. Otherwise put, we have no good reason to think that any extant framework is apt to explain verbal behaviour or rational action more generally. As it stands, the argument directed at Skinner is wholly negative and gives us no warrant whatever to infer anything about familiar mentalistic vocabulary, pro or con. 21 It may be further noted that Chomsky's pointing out that a behaviourist framework fails to accommodate the most elementary facts of language acquisition and syntax does not in any way depend on folk categories. The arguments, for instance, do not credit speaker/hearers with propositional knowledge or belief-desire reasoning; they go through on data alone without an accompanying favoured explanatory framework. This is just to repeat one of the key points from the top of this section: the review is officially neutral on the correct explanation, if any, of linguistic behaviour.
This criticism of FA is further buttressed if we consider the competence/performance distinction. The distinction is not in play in the review, although it is implicit in both The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory ([1955-6/1975] ) and Syntactic Structures ([1957] ) (the locus classicus of the distinction is the first chapter of Aspects ([1965] ), which was written in the late 1950s). In essence, the distinction is between verbal behaviour and its 21 Throughout the review, Chomsky does point out that the folk's vernacular is more fine-grained than Skinner's jargon, but this is a comparative judgement that is trivially true (cf. Chomsky's [1973] review of Skinner [1971] ). interpretation (performance) and the cognitive resources (competence) necessary to account for such performance. Alternatively: 'performance' covers the processes of linguistic action and 'competence' covers the 'information' such processes access. 22 Chomsky has never offered a theory of performance, and is neutral to sceptical on whether any adequate theory will be forthcoming, although a theory of competence will clearly form the basis of any such theory, might one ever come along. 23 In this light, the argument of the review may be read as saying that the problem with Skinner's model is that it wholly neglects competence. As Chomsky ([1959] , p. 574) puts it: 'no approach to language that fails to take these deeper processes [read: competence] into account can possibly achieve much success in accounting for actual linguistic behavior.' So, to think that folk psychology qua a general account of behaviour (inter alia) is vindicated to some degree by the failure of the learning theoretic account is simply to conflate performance with competence. Folk psychology appears not to enter into our understanding of competence at all, just as learning theory does not. That the latter is therefore wholly inadequate to account for verbal behaviour should lead one to think likewise of the former. We shall return to this point, for many do think that competence is a state that falls under a folk understanding. Before that, let us look at how the review should be read.
As an alternative to FA, consider EA: (EA, the Eliminativist Argument)
1. The behaviourists (Skinner) argue that colloquial mentalistic vocabulary is non-explanatory of behaviour. It may be fruitfully replaced by learning theoretic vocabulary-stimulus, response, control, reinforcement, probability, etc.-that places the cause of behaviour in environmental variables, not internal states.
2. But the terms of the new nomenclature are 'mere homonyms, with at most a vague similarity of meaning' to the vocabulary defined in the lab. In fact, the terms are 'metaphoric' of our 'mentalistic' ones,
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The notion of 'information' might appear to be intentional itself, if not used in the strict anti-entropic sense. This is a tricky issue. Suffice it to say, for present purposes we may simply note that, for Chomsky, all that is crucial is the distinction between systems, not a distinction between a mechanism and what it represents. See (Collins [2004] ) for details.
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There has been much needless confusion over this issue. An account of any aspect of performance requires an account of the (syntactic/semantic) information accessible to the performance systems, but an account of that information is not an account of performance itself, for performance involves a massive interaction of many factors. This is most clearly witnessed in our ready ability to assign an interpretation to 'ungrammatical' strings, such as the many half sentences and garbled talk we process daily, and our inability to assign interpretations to 'grammatical' strings (e.g. garden paths, etc.). This point is explicit in (Chomsky [1965] , Chapter 1) and is belaboured in (Fodor [1981] ; Chomsky [1982] ). None of this is to suggest that the competence/performance distinction is inviolable; for recent doubts, see (Carston [2002] ; Jackendoff [2002] ).
which 'simply disguises a complete retreat to mentalistic psychology' (Chomsky [1959] , pp. 552-3).
3. Therefore, the 'terminological revision adds no objectivity to the familiar mentalistic mode of description' (ibid., p. 556), especially when 'used with the full vagueness of the ordinary vocabulary' (ibid., p. 559).
4. But it just does not follow that the mentalistic vocabulary is explanatory. 'It is futile to inquire into the causation of verbal behavior [or any other type of behaviour] until much more is known about the specific character of this behavior' (ibid., p. 575).
Evidently, this is a quite different argument from FA: it does not offer any support whatsoever to-let alone vindication of-our colloquial mentalistic vocabulary; in fact, the argument claims that the very failure of the learning theoretic vocabulary to advance beyond mentalism is its principal failing-a rose by any other name would smell as foul. In other words, the argument of the review of Skinner is a species of M-SE. Given the history of Chomsky's Skinner review, EA bears some elaboration.
The fist premise is agreed upon by all, and may pass without further comment. The second premise and its conclusion in (3) reflect the heart of the review's argument. Chomsky ([1959] , pp. 251-2) presents a dilemma for Skinner. Skinner sets out to show that behaviour in general is lawful, i.e. it is under stimulus control. Of course, as our knowledge stands, we really have not a hope of describing such laws under the strict conditions under which the learning theoretic vocabulary is used in the lab. So, the behaviourist must either admit that, as things stand, behaviour can't be understood as lawful or else he may restrict himself to those areas of behaviour that are lawful, such as the barpressing behaviour of trained rats. Either way, we have no reason to think that learning theory should replace folk psychology. Skinner, however, evades the dilemma by metaphorically extending the technical language of the laboratory to cover any piece of behaviour as required. Yet, this 'metaphoric reading. . . is no more scientific than the traditional approaches to the subject matter [viz.
folk psychology]' (Chomsky [1959] , p. 552). That is to say, the new vocabulary is merely a misleading paraphrase of familiar modes of description, and does not constitute an insight into the actual causal antecedents of behaviour, let alone an appropriate vocabulary for the natural kinds of human behaviour. A nice example of Chomsky's critical method is provided by his response to Skinner's notion of a proper noun being a response under the stimulus control of a person or thing (ibid., p. 553). If taken literally, that is, as the term stimulus control is used in the laboratory, this means that one is more likely to use a proper noun-its use is reinforced -when one is in the presence of the controlling thing or person. This is transparently absurd and can't be what Skinner intends-not only is the prediction false, but it is hard to see how one could generally be under the control of 'things' picked out by proper nouns such as England, Henry VIII, Sherlock Holmes, etc. So, as Chomsky (ibid., p. 554) notes, it 'appears that the word control here is merely a misleading paraphrase for the traditional denote or refer'.
As the theoretical situation stands, then, we are still in the domain of folk psychology: the new vocabulary of the laboratory extends to cover verbal behaviour only by metaphorical extension. In itself, of course, this does not signal the inadequacy of folk psychology; minimally, it shows that the new vocabulary is at best equal to the traditional mentalistic one. Chomsky assumes, however, that folk psychology does not constitute an adequate basis for the explanation of behaviour, verbal or otherwise. 24 Two factors need to be separated here: performance and competence. Firstly, although folk psychology covers verbal behaviour, Chomsky claims that no adequate account of behaviour is so much as on the horizon. Throughout the 1960s and continuing up to the present, Chomsky has claimed that free action, such as intentional verbal behaviour, is potentially a mystery beyond our understanding. 25 If this is so, then we might be fated never to move beyond folk psychology, even though it is constitutively incapable of providing explanatorily deep, predictive generalizations. Secondly, Chomsky does not so much as consider the thought that traditional mentalism may cast light on, or constrain, syntax and its acquisition. 26 Again, his position has not changed in the intervening years. Chomsky ([1965] , p. 4) has, for sure, described his position as a species of 'mentalism', but only in a 'technical sense', i.e. '[m]entalistic linguistics is simply theoretical linguistics that uses performance as data . . . for the determination of competence, the latter being the primary object of its investigation ' (ibid., p. 193, n.1) . Further, in the same 24 As previously noted, throughout his review Chomsky makes clear that the new vocabulary is much less fine-grained than the traditional mentalistic one. The present point is that at no stage are we led from this platitude to the conclusion that the traditional vocabulary is explanatorily adequate.
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It is worth noting that the recalcitrance of performance 'at will' is not confined to high-level abilities. We have little idea in any domain of action of any species how to explain choice and concomitant action (e.g. shift of visual attention as noted by Helmholtz). This is a point Schopenhauer ([1835 Schopenhauer ([ /1999 ) stressed.
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In Logical Structure (Chomsky [1955 (Chomsky [ -56/1975 Clearly, Chomsky is here dealing with two construals of 'mentalism': a technical, methodological sense, premised on the competence/performance distinction, and the traditional sense embodied in our familiar psychological idioms. Inquiry governed by mentalist principles in the former sense is in no way constrained-a priori or otherwise-to validate our folk conception. Further, Chomsky's denial of the claim that the behaviourist vocabulary is 'scientific' in comparison with the traditional vocabulary does not suggest that the latter is 'scientific'; the clear implication is that neither is deserving of the epithet. Indeed, since behaviourism differs from 'traditional mentalism' 'only' in terms of relative obscurity, it would seem that technical mentalism marks a substantial departure from its traditional namesake.
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So, for reasons independent of the particular failure of behaviourism, folk psychology is not adequate for scientific employment. The failure of both is an instance of the putative failure of every theory of behaviour. The failure of folk psychology in particular follows from the thesis of M-SE: folk theories do not make for science. Of course, this meta-thesis is entirely independent of any claims concerning behaviourism in particular.
Issues of Interpretation
A chief component of the argument so far is that folk categories are not essential to the development of theories of linguistic competence. Such categories might well be essential to our understanding (as far as it goes) of linguistic behaviourperformance, but such an aspect of our linguistic wherewithal is, or so it seems, beyond the reach of scientific inquiry. Linguistic competence is not so recalcitrant. Thus, if the eliminativist reading is to be maintained, then folk categories had better not be central to our understanding of linguistic competence. Yet the prima facie problem with this demand is that since the 27 In more recent work, Chomsky has used 'mentalism' to refer to naturalistic inquiry of cognitive phenomena (brain states and their function): a research program as legitimate if not as advanced of those of chemistry or biology (e.g. Chomsky [2000a] , pp. 5-6). Again, the use of 'mentalism' here does not imply any a priori commitment to the integrity of folk explanation. early 1960s Chomsky has readily appealed to knowledge of language as the object of linguistic inquiry. If Chomsky's position as early as 1959 was as I have depicted it, how come Chomsky spent the next few decades apparently claiming just the opposite? It is hardly surprising, in this light, that the significance of the Skinner review should be seen as positively supporting a certain mentalistic conception that is happily square with our ordinary notions. Rey ([2003a Rey ([ ], [2003b ), in particular, has recently expressed critical bemusement that Chomsky no longer appears to believe what he once did, i.e. that propositional knowledge of grammar is computationally instantiated in the neuronal substrate such that it may enter into the aetiology of linguistic performance, just as our folk theory has it. Chomsky's ([2003b] ) response that the apparent intentional commitments were merely motivating glosses or metaphors might seem to some as 'creative' as my own reading of the Skinner review.
Chomsky exegesis is a complex matter, if for no other reason than that he has said many different things to many different audiences over the past 40 years. Still, I think a good case can be made that Chomsky has been as consistent as my portrayal depicts him to be. Of course, the particular psychology of a particular person is not that important. Who cares if, of late, Chomsky has changed his mind? The crucial issue is how we should understand and interpret the dominant theories in linguistics. In this regard, I think it has been an error to see them as essentially being a progression on, or even a vindication of, our ordinary folksy understanding. I shall briefly assess three factors that have led to the misconstrual, as I see it. I do not, suffice it to say, intend the following remarks to be unassailable, but they do carry a significant weight, I believe.
A grammar as a theory
From the mid-1950s to the late 1970s, Chomsky suggested that a generative grammar was best thought of as a theory. For example, in the Skinner review, we find the following passage from the final section that briefly elaborates Chomsky's positive view: The speaker's task is to select a particular compatible set of optional rules. If we know, from grammatical study, what choices are available to him and what conditions of compatibility the choices must meet, we can proceed meaningfully to investigate the factors that lead him to make one choice or another. The listener (or reader) must determine from an exhibited utterance, what optional rules were chosen in the construction of the utterance. [. . .] The child who learns a language has in some sense constructed the grammar for himself on the basis of observation of sentences and non-sentences (i.e. corrections by the verbal community). Study of the actual observed ability of a speaker . . . apparently forces us to the conclusion . . . that the young child has succeeded in carrying out . . . a remarkable type of theory construction . . . The fact [of remarkable rapidity] suggests that human beings are somehow specially designed to do this, with datahandling or 'hypothesis-formulating' ability of unknown character and complexity. [. . .] In principle it may be possible to study the problem of determining what the built-in structure of an information-processing (hypothesis forming) system must be to enable it to arrive at the grammar of a language from the available data in the available time. (Chomsky [1959], pp. 577-8) The italics (my own) mark the expressions that appear to show Chomsky being committed to an intentional framework of explanation. Similar passages can be found throughout Chomsky's works from the 1950s to the 1990s. 28 If we take Chomsky at his apparent word, then it is difficult not to see him as being committed to an intentional framework. Theory construction is an intentional activity par excellence. The language-acquiring child must represent a hypothesis, compare it to the available data, evaluate its fit with the data, assess other possible hypotheses, and arrive at a judgement as to the best hypothesis. In sum, acquiring a language on this model is a rational achievement. 29 Upon closer examination, however, it is questionable that Chomsky was seriously considering this model as a genuine theoretical account. I think we can see Chomsky as employing 'theory' as a trope or metaphor. What was crucial about the 'theory' talk was not the appeal to hypothesis testing or the other explicitly intentional notions, in general, anything that would make acquiring a language a rational achievement. What the theory talk did, rather, was capture the formal and structural features of competence and its development in such a way as to place it far beyond the reaches of any empiricist/behaviourist account. Talking of theories did this well enough, but it is a quite separate issue whether the linguistic theories developed required any answers to the philosophical problems that arise once one employs intentional vocabulary. Thus, when the principles and parameters model was developed 28 For Chomsky's characterization of a grammar and/or our knowledge of language as being theoretic, see (Chomsky [1955 (Chomsky [ -56/1975 (Chomsky [ ], pp. 77-8, [1957 (Chomsky [ ], pp. 49-50, [1959 (Chomsky [ ], pp. 574-8, [1962 (Chomsky [ ], pp. 528-9/535, [1965 (Chomsky [ ], pp. 58-9, [1975 (Chomsky [ ], pp. 15-20, [1980a , pp. 102-3). See (Matthews [1984] ) for an account of the importance to 'rationalism' of the theoretical vocabulary. The demise of the 'theory' terminology arose from the development of the principles and parameters model that views linguistic development not as hypothesis confirmation but more as a physical process of growth or parameter setting of a polymorphic system, as is found throughout biology (Chomsky [1981] ). (Just what parameter setting involves is notoriously obscure, but the thought is that it is mechanistic, notwithstanding the 'theoretical' elaboration it sometimes receives.) The basis of this idea goes back to Lenneberg ([1967] ), who was a major influence on Chomsky's thought (see Chomsky [1975 Chomsky [ ], [1980a ). The minimalist program pushes this general approach further (see Chomsky [1995] , [2000b] , [2002] ; Uriagereka [1998] ). For recent discussion of the earlier 'theory' conception, see (Chomsky [2003c] , [2005] , pp. 7-8, [2006] , pp. x-xi; Chomsky et al. [2005] ).
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'Rational achievement' is an expression of Higginbotham's ([1991] ), although I take the sentiment to express the traditional view of generative linguistics. See (Collins [2004] ).
in the late 1970s/early 1980s, linguists of the generative tradition saw how to ditch theory talk and took this to be an advance.
Note, in support of this reading, that in the passage quoted, 'hypothesisformulating' occurs in 'scare quotes'. In the same section, Chomsky ([1959] , p. 576) writes: 'It is reasonable to regard the grammar of a language L ideally as a mechanism that provides an enumeration of the sentences of L in something like the way in which a deductive theory gives an enumeration of a set of theorems' (my emphasis). Similarly: 'What [the child] accomplishes can fairly be described as theory construction of a non-trivial kind . . . a theory that predicts the grammatical structure of each of an infinite class of potential physical events' (Chomsky [1962] , p. 528). A few years later: 'It seems plain that language acquisition is based on the child's discovery of what from a formal point of view is a deep and abstract theory-a generative grammar for his language-many of the concepts and principles of which are only remotely related to experience by long and intricate chains of unconscious quasi-inferential steps' (Chomsky [1965] , p. 58).
It would seem that Chomsky is using 'theory' and the attendant terminology in a specific sense; he is not depicting the child to be a little scientist as such, but rather suggesting that aspects of the capacities generative theory attributes to the child might be fruitfully conceived as being theory-like. Again, what is crucial here is that there is a formal correspondence, which usurps the then prevailing empiricist models. In this light, theory-talk might well be properly seen as a motivating gloss on the generative theories of transformational structure that is radically underdetermined by data available to the child.
There are roughly four related senses in which a grammar might be understood to be a theory. 30 Firstly, a grammar is a quasi-deductive structure (at least on the early model), with T-markers or deep/surface structure pairs serving as the predictions the theory makes as derived from the base given a specified set of generalizations or transformations. Secondly, a grammar is underdetermined by the data. In this sense, like a theory, a grammar is not a mere description of, or generalization over, the data. Thirdly, a grammar deals with unobservables (concepts indefinable in experiential terms) and generalizations that go far beyond any data set. Fourthly, grammars are evaluated not merely in terms of empirical coverage; some measure of simplicity and economy is also relevant. Now, these features are 'formal' in Chomsky's sense; he is perfectly happy to describe a grammar so understood as a 'mechanism' or a 'device' (in a sense familiar from computability theory). Further, the child who constructs a 30 In Logical Structure, Chomsky ([1955 Chomsky ([ -56/1975 ], p. 119) presented general linguistic theory, soon to be psychologized as universal grammar, as being a 'philosophy of science', where the science in question was the particular grammars or theories developed for particular languages. theory-like grammar need not be viewed as an agent in any sense. In a note to the long passage quoted above, Chomsky writes: 'there is nothing essentially mysterious about this ['hypothesis formulation']. Complex innate behaviour patterns and ''innate tendencies to learn in specific ways'' have been carefully studied in lower organisms' (Chomsky [1959] , p. 577, n. 48). From Aspects: 'the structure of particular languages may very well be largely determined by factors over which the individual has no conscious control . . . [A] child cannot help constructing a particular sort of transformational grammar to account for the data presented to him, any more than he can control his perception of solid objects or his attention to line and angle' (Chomsky [1965] , p. 59).
Thus, it seems that Chomsky is using 'theory' to pick out certain 'formal' features of generative grammars that distinguish them from empiricist models. On this basis, one can understand the child to be a theorist, yet such a theorist is not a rational agent, but a 'device', whose state resembles in relevant respects the achievements of rational agents. In this light, it is perfectly reasonable for Chomsky to motivate the generative model by treating the child as if he were an agent who manages the 'rational achievement' of acquiring a language. Of course, humans are agents, but not qua theoretical acquirers of language. 31 31 Rey ([2003a Rey ([ ], [2003b ) is particularly doubtful of Chomsky's insistence that appeal to intentional concepts such as 'representation' and 'knowledge' is simply 'informal shorthand' (e.g. Chomsky [2003b] ). For example, Rey ([2003b] , pp. 160, 165) cites as crucial evidence Matthews's ([1980] ) query that the development of the principles and parameters model perhaps marks an end to intentional explanation in linguistics. To this, Chomsky ([1980b] ) apparently responds 'No'. However, Chomsky (personal communication to Rey) insists that his response is a reductio of the role of intentional explanation/description! To my mind, the issue here turns on how intentional talk is construed. Matthews, in essence, suggests that there is a tension between the 'rationalist' (/intentional) construal of 'language faculty', under which it is a learnt object of knowledge, and the P&P model's conception of language 'growing' in the head, i.e. the latter suggests a physiological explanatory vocabulary rather than a folksy one. Chomsky's response is clear: the P&P model does stand in opposition to any learning model (hypothesis testing) but not to intentional vocabulary as such. The reason given is that we can have different levels of description/explanation, but, crucially, we are talking of the same thing: 'These mental structures can be regarded as characterizations of certain physical systems, which are the realization of what we describe in an intentional idiom' (Chomsky [1980b] , p. 47). In other words, the various rules, lexical items, phrase structures, etc. that comprise grammars are not the represented objects of physical states; rather, we take the grammars to characterize physical states in terms that answer to our primary data source of competent linguistic judgement, i.e. the theory is of the human brain, not something else the brain putatively represents. There is no representation/represented dichotomy. So, while Matthews and Chomsky agree about the legitimacy of the intentional level, they appear to conceive of it differently. Matthews takes the 'rationalist' (intentionalist) to be talking solely about the represented content (the attained state of knowledge), not the 'mechanism' (Matthews [1980] , p. 26). Chomsky explicitly rejects this construal: the intentional talk just is talk of 'mechanism', albeit at a different level; crucially, it is not talk of what the mechanism represents, for it represents nothing. Thus, if the intentional talk is legitimate, it is uniformly legitimate. That is, if the intentional level is appropriate for the attained state, then it is ipso facto appropriate for the initial state and its transitions. Clearly, then, pace Matthews, in no sense should the P&P model cast doubt on the legitimacy of intentional talk tout court. So, there is no interdiction against 'representation' talk; but we should cease to think of such talk as implying that there is a language or grammar to which subjects stand in a relation of representation. This way of reading the debate also It bears noting that Chomsky's analogy of generative grammars to theories has ceased owing to two related factors. One is the development of the principles and parameters model that depicts language acquisition as a nontheoretical switching mechanism (see note 27). The other factor is a change in the character of the theories themselves, which now describe a uniform computational process and the factors that constrain it. In this respect, there are no conceptually rich laws specific to each language (Collins [2004] ; Chomsky [2005] ). Of course, it might be that Chomsky has changed his mind, but that is irrelevant, for the developments show that the apparent commitment to children as rational theorists was not an essential part of the generative model of a science of language.
Cartesian linguistics
From the early 1960s on, Chomsky ([1964] , [1965] , [1966] , [1968/72], [1975] ) has consistently appealed to the 'Cartesian' tradition for motivation and fruitful antecedents to the generative enterprise (the tradition goes from English neoPlatonists (Cudworth, Herbert) through Descartes and Port Royal, up to Kant, Schlegel, and Humboldt) . For Chomsky, the 'Cartesian' epithet is a loose descriptive term that is not intended to cover only Cartesians or all facets of Cartesian philosophy. 32 Still, it is very easy to see Chomsky as aligning himself with Descartes in the sense that his concerns are primarily epistemological, and he has been read in this way by Fodor ([1983] , [2000] ), perhaps the most influential reader of Chomsky. On this view, Chomsky is concerned with 'innate knowledge of language' much as Descartes, Leibniz, and others were concerned with our peculiar knowledge of geometry and the Deity. None is, in the first instance, if at all, making any claims as to the structure of the human brain; their concern is for the epistemic standing of our knowledge. I have responded to this reading at length elsewhere (Collins [2004] ); here, I only want to point to some contrary evidence.
Firstly, Chomsky's initial appeal to the notion of innateness was made on the basis of the work of Lenneberg (Chomsky [1959 (Chomsky [ ], p. 577, n. 48, [1962 , p. 529, n. 2), not Descartes or Leibniz. Chomsky saw linguistic competence or knowledge as a factor that enters into linguistic behaviour, although one that cannot be appears to be the way Matthews ([1984] , pp. 512-5) himself reads it. Matthews ([1984] ) also rightly acknowledges that dispensing with the intentional/theoretical vocabulary is not to cease to be a 'nativist', i.e. the object of one's inquiry remains the structure of the human brain. Egan ([1992] ) makes a similar point with regard to propositional attitude ascription and the computational structure of the visual system.
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Especially see (Chomsky and Katz [1975] ) for an explicit elaboration of what 'Cartesian' is meant to cover, although the point is explicit enough in the preface to (Chomsky [1966] ).
accounted for in terms of the control of behaviour via external variables. The concern here is not for epistemology but a theoretical factorization of the components that might explain our linguistic behaviour (especially see Chomsky [1975] , Chapter 1). Thus, Chomsky ([1959] , pp. 548-9, 577, n. 48) accuses Skinner of wholly neglecting the 'biological structure' of the organism. Skinner is not accused of getting the epistemology wrong.
Secondly, Chomsky's concern was to offer an explicitly formulated version of the 'rationalist/Cartesian' strain of thought in a particular domain, the explicitness enabling empirical testability (Chomsky [1965] , p. 53). In this sense, the old theories were 'reconstructed as empirical theories' (Chomsky and Katz [1975] , p. 77). Again, as we saw above, the epistemic standing of the speaker is not at issue. It is not lost on anyone, of course, that the knowledge at issue, however construed, need not be conscious. My present point is that, for Chomsky, as soon as we dispense with a condition of 'conscious accessibility' epistemological issues of warrant or justification cease to be relevant. The 'knowledge' theoretically attributed is a structured state to which the speaker stands in no external relation at all, although the state does contribute to the linguistic judgements of the speaker, which may thus serve as evidence for the nature of the state (Chomsky [1965] , pp. 8-9). 33 We may rightfully call such states 'cognitive' as a reflection of the phenomena that concern us (phenomena picked out as being mental as opposed to chemical or pancreatic or whatever), but the designation does not mark them out as being essentially different from other kinds of states studied in science or, perforce, as demanding a distinct methodology. In sum, Chomsky does not separate the cognitive state from what is known in virtue of being in that state. In this light, for a child to be a little theorist is simply for the child's cognitive state to stand in relation to his experience in certain formal respects that can be modelled on the reflective relation a scientist has towards data. The 'metaphor' is enlightening or not, but it was never a substantial explanatory commitment.
Common cause
Throughout the period that concerns us, Chomsky ([1968/72] , [1968], [1975] ) was at pains to establish linguistic inquiry as a genuine naturalistic pursuit; in particular, he sought to spike philosophical claims that linguistics was infected with various dubious rationalist philosophical assumptions about innate knowledge or conscious access. In this regard, Chomsky made 33 It is worth noting in this regard that Chomsky has never concerned himself with substantiating 'knowledge' as a relation between the speaker and a language or a state of the speaker himself. In this regard, Chomsky stands apart from, e.g., (Fodor [1968a] ; Graves et al. [1973] ; Peacocke [1989] ; Davies [1989] ). For detailed discussion of this issue, see Collins ([2004] , [2006] ).
common cause with 'intentional realists', such as Fodor and Katz, against the various species of anti-realism that claimed that 'there is no fact of the matter' about either semantic or syntactic properties, or that the only facts are dispositional or behavioural. Chomsky's concern, however, may be rightly seen as a commitment to a properly formulated rationalism as an empirical research program. As we have seen, this does not involve an essential commitment to the explanatory status of intentional vocabulary; the commitment, rather, was to the empirical integrity of the domains commonly picked out by 'knowledge' and 'meaning'. In other words, Chomsky sought to secure an area of empirical research, not to establish that the explanations in that area are to be framed in an intentional manner.
That those who doubted the empirical integrity of the intentional idiom also doubted that there were facts of the matter was not Chomsky's chief concern; he only sought to show that empirical inquiry could be conducted, i.e. there are facts of the matter beyond behaviour, no matter how one chooses to describe them. This approach is explicitly set out in Section 8 of the opening chapter of Aspects and rearticulated throughout (Chomsky [1975] ). To repeat, I do not intend the above considerations to be decisive, nor even to speak to much of Rey's ([2003a Rey's ([ ], [2003b ) careful discussions. In particular, the issue of the apparent intentionality of 'representational' states of the brain remains: how it is, for example, that the human brain represents verb phrases, case features, etc. This issue, I think, is independent from the present one. It might be, for example, that some notion of representation is essential to the idea of computation, but that would not establish that every computational theory of a cognitive competence trades in propositional attitudes. Indeed, it might well be that the operative notion of representation is quite distant from the folksy idea of a proposition. 34 It is doubtful, for example, that the idea 34 See (Collins [2004] , [2006] ) for the idea that the notion of a linguistic representation might be understood in wholly structural terms. Georges Rey ([2006] ) suggests that any such account does not relieve one of the burden of an account of intentionality, for representation (intentionality) need not be an external relation. On the contrary, Rey thinks that an intentional object-as represented-is a reflex of representation, independent of any external correlate, and so a commitment to internal structuralism, as it were, does not relieve one of a duty to explicate a notion of intentional content. This is just as well for linguistics, for what goes into a linguistic representation has no external correlate; indeed, familiarly, even a phone has no discrete acoustic correlate. Thus, Rey suggests that the representation of linguistic structure might be an element of a shared projected 'reality', i.e. there is nothing external that is represented. The problem with this thought is that this projective model requires at least an 'as if' representation of something external if we are to speak with Rey ([2006] , p. 239) of a folie a'deux. Talk of illusion might seem reasonable as Rey avers, following Chomsky and Halle ([1968] ), if our topic is phonology, but much of linguistic structure is not even notionally external. It is very difficult to see the mind/brain as suffering from a systematic illusion that linguistic features (functional heads, PRO, little-v, etc.) are 'out there'. I think this is incoherent-we suffer illusions, our mind/brains do not. This point was also made by (Chomsky and Halle [1968] , pp. 24-6). For more on this issue, see (Collins [forthcoming] ). of misrepresentation has any application to the language faculty, and so the relevant idea is not representation-of. 35 That said, the considerations above do point towards the reading I offered of the Skinner review. They also serve to make less 'shocking' Chomsky's recent remarks on the status of intentional, folksy expressions. To these I now turn.
Chomsky's Current View
Consider the following recent remarks by Chomsky (Chomsky and Stemmer [1999] , p. 397):
[I]n English one uses the locutions 'know a language,' 'knowledge of language,' where other (even similar) linguistic systems use such terms as 'have a language,' 'speak a language,' etc. That may be one reason why it is commonly supposed (by English speakers) that some sort of cognitive relation holds between Jones and his language, which is somehow 'external' to Jones; or that Jones has a 'theory of his language,' a theory that he 'knows' or 'partially knows.' . . . One should not expect such concepts to play a role in systematic inquiry into the nature, use, and acquisition of language, and related matters, any more than one expects such informal notions as 'heat' or 'element' or 'life' to survive beyond rudimentary stages of the natural sciences.
Chomsky here is not denying that we know languages; his point is that the locution simply reflects English collocation, and facts of collocation don't make for theoretical insight, although they often make for metaphysical and epistemological confusion. So, the epistemic locution is perfectly appropriate to pick out, albeit informally, the object of linguistic inquiry. For instance, the linguist is primarily concerned with the judgements made by competent users of a language, rather than with acts of usage qua performance. 36 35 It is sometimes suggested that the divergence between competence and performance with garden path sentences and similar constructions supports the idea of linguistic error, as if the normal speaker is in error in not recognizing, e.g. The horse raced past the barn fell to be grammatical. This thought is highly dubious. Would we want to say that normal speakers are in error in not recognizing a construction with twenty central embeddings to be grammatical? The attributions of error are, it seems, simply misleading ways of marking the competence/performance distinction. More generally, 'misrepresentation' and 'error' are folksy notions that might well mark out real phenomena, but our explanations are not beholden to the notions, just as we can explain aspects of linguistic judgment without resort to the idea of a grammatical error (cf. Egan [2003] It might seem that putting matters this way places the folksy notion of judgement at the heart of linguistic theory. We must, though, distinguish between theory and data. Linguistic judgements are the preponderate data, and so informally mark out the object of inquiry, but this is only contingently so; it might be that advances in neuroscience will enable richer direct data from brain structure, even if it is wholly unclear at the moment what such data would look like. 37 In general, there is no restriction on what the relevant data are, for the genuine object of inquiry-what our theories are about-is arrived at a posteriori: our theoretical conception of language is whatever serves to explain most coherently what we determine to be the relevant data-there is no a priori constraint from folk notions of language. Presently, and perhaps forever more, we have no way of identifying the relevant data apart from using folk notions. But data and theory are not the same. The theories we develop will not attribute to the speaker/hearer beliefs about our theoretical technology. That is, the present theories are about the structure of speaker/hearers' brains, not an independent 'something' of which the speaker/hearer has knowledge. 38 In other words, intuitive judgement is included in the explananda of our theories, it is not part of the explanans. Nothing would change, at the level of theory, if we were incapable of reflective judgement on what our utterances mean. Selfconsciousness is one thing, linguistic capacity is another (Chomsky [2000a] , pp. 142-3; cf. Collins [forthcoming] ).
So, there is nothing wrong at all with our folksy way of talking; indeed, it is, and may ever be, indispensable to our picking out the relevant phenomena. (b) *Bill persuaded to be examined by the doctor.
37
As Fodor ([1981] ) noted, there is no restriction on potentially relevant data. The fact remains, however, that research on syntax via, e.g., neuronal and deficit studies is guided by syntactic theory, whose evidential base is preponderantly native speaker/hearer intuitions. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the situation being otherwise: could neuronal studies persuade us that a given sentence is not ambiguous in the way we imagined it was? See (Chomsky [1955 (Chomsky [ -56/1975 ], pp. 101-3) for an early discussion of this point and (Grodzinsky [1990] ) for a seminal experimental approach.
38
This follows from what Chomsky calls the internalist perspective: 'there is a special component of the human brain (call it the 'language faculty') that is specially dedicated to language. That subsystem of the brain (or the mind, from an abstract perspective) has an initial state which is genetically determined, like all other components of the body: the kidney, the circularity system, and so on' (Chomsky [1996] , p. 13). See (Chomsky [1986 (Chomsky [ ], [2000a ; Collins [2004] ).
There is no problem for ordinary language . . . But there is no reason to suppose that common usage of such terms as language or learning (or belief and numerous others like them), or others belonging to similar semantic fields in other linguistic systems, will find any place in attempts to understand the aspects of the world to which they pertain. Likewise, no one expects the commonsense terms energy or liquid or life to play a role in the sciences, beyond a rudimentary level. The issues are much the same. (Chomsky [2000b], p. 23) In line with M-SE, Chomsky is decrying any suggestion that our common theory-free idioms are under threat from scientific advance. But that their mere presence might be inviolable offers no reason to think that they are likely to partake in a genuine scientific understanding of the phenomena they currently pick out. As Chomsky makes clear, one requires no advance at all in the science of the mind to arrive at this judgement in regard to folk psychology; the judgement follows from a simple generalization from the cases of physics, biology, and chemistry. The burden is on those who see the science of the mind as dependent on folk categories to make clear how scientific-as opposed to philosophical-advancement relies on such dependence. At least in the case of linguistics, Chomsky's judgement is that the burden can't be met.
